ARBITRAGE AND ADVANCE REFUNDING
MANLY W. MUMFORD*

Municipalities occasionally find themselves in a position where it
would be to their financial advantage to redeem their outstanding bonds
prior to maturity. The bonds may have been issued at an interest rate
higher than that currently prevailing, thus making it advantageous for
the issuer to call in the old bonds and issue new securities at the lower
rate.' Alternatively, the outstanding bonds may be secured by covenants restricting the government's ability to obtain financing for other
needed improvements. 2 Normally, these covenants can be dissolved
once sufficient funds are available to pay the outstanding obligations.
In many cases, however, the issuer is either unable or chooses not
to redeem its obligations prior to maturity. By their terms the bonds
may not be callable for several years, or they may be callable only on
payment of a substantial redemption premium. In situations such as
these, the issuer can often achieve the purpose of the refunding by
"advance refunding." This practice involves the issuance of new bonds
and the application of the proceeds to the purchase of other obligations,
usually United States Government bonds. These are deposited in escrow and will mature as to principal and interest in sufficient amounts
and at appropriate times to provide money to pay the bonds being
refunded when due.
The advance refunding procedure provides an opportunity for
benefits beyond simply achieving the effect of a refunding of outstanding bonds. The potential for arbitrage profits also exists. Because the
interest on municipal securities is exempt from the federal income tax, 3
the yield on these securities is usually lower than that produced by federal government obligations, the interest on which is taxable. The imposition of income tax on interest paid to holders of federal government
bonds generally operates to equalize these yields. Municipalities, how* Partner, Chapman and Cutler, Chicago, Illinois.
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1. See L. MOAK, ADMINISTRATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 398-413 (1970).

2. See id. at 413-15.
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103(a). The section provides:
Gross income does not include interest on(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United
States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the District
of Columbia. ...
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ever, are not subject to the federal income tax. 4 They are therefore able
to borrow money at the lower municipal rate of interest and invest this

money in higher-yielding federal obligations without being subject to the
federal tax burden.

It is this practice to which the term "arbitrage"

refers.6
This Article will trace the development of the arbitrage/advance
refunding practice. The first section will briefly discuss the origins of
the practice and describe the most widely used advance refunding techniques. State law restraints on advance refundings will also be examined.
The second section will deal with the attempts by the Treasury Department to prohibit abuses of the municipalities' privilege to issue tax-exempt
bonds without unduly constraining legitimate financial maneuvering.

The final section will consider the potential applicability of the federal
securities laws to the practice.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARBITRAGE/ADVANCE
REFUNDING SCHEME

In 1961 the City of Phoenix, Arizona was faced with the need to
acquire additional water facilities. Two closed lien revenue bond issues0 were outstanding, so that any further water revenue bond financing had to be accomplished on a third lien basis-hardly conducive to
selling the bonds at a reasonable rate of interest. The city could have
issued general obligation bonds, 7 but such bonds would have counted
against the city's debt limit s and thereby impeded the financing of other
4. Gross income does not include(1) income derived from ... the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing to a State . . . . or any political subdivision thereof, or the
District of Columbia. . . . INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 115(a).
5. The term "arbitrage bond" is defined in section 103(c) (2) of the Code. (The
section was changed from (d) to (c) by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455.) See text accompanying note 28 infra.
6. A revenue bond is an obligation which is payable solely from the revenues of a
particular enterprise and not from the general taxing power of the municipality. The
resolution, ordinance, or indenture securing these bonds may or may not permit the
issuer to secure future issues with the same source of revenue. Where such a practice is
prohibited, the original bonds are called "closed lien" revenue bonds. See L. MOAK,
supra note 1, at 202-05, 331-32.
7. General obligation bonds are those which are secured by the full faith and credit
of the issuer and are generally payable from property taxes on all taxable property within
the boundaries of the issuer. 15 E. MCQUILLIN, LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 477
(3d ed. 1970).
8. A debt limit is a constitutional or statutory restriction upon the incurring of
indebtedness, usually measured as a percentage of the assessed valuation of taxable
property within the boundaries of the issuer. For example, in Arizona municipal corporations are prohibited from issuing debt in excess of four percent for some purposes
and 15% for others of the value of their taxable property. Aniz. CONsT. art. IX, § 8.
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needed projects. A bond dealer suggested that the city consider advance refunding of the first and second lien revenue bonds prior to
issuing new water revenue bonds. The third lien bonds would then be
treated in the market place as first lien bonds because the holders would
not have to fear that in case of a shortage of revenues the prior lien
bonds would be paid in full before these third lien bonds would be paid
at all. The bond dealer thought that the city might be able to save
money as a result of the differential between the rates of interest it
would have to pay on the new advance refunding bonds and the higher
rates of interest it would receive from the government bonds in which
the proceeds would be invested. After the city had agreed to proceed
and the enabling legislation had been enacted, the bond dealer and the
city put their pencils to paper and found that the savings would be even
greater than they had anticipated.
An example will illustrate the profit potential of such an advance
refunding scheme. A municipality which issues a $1,000 ten-year bond
with 4.5% interest compounded semiannually will be required to repay
slightly over $1,560 by maturity. If the proceeds of the bond issue were
immediately invested in other ten-year bonds paying 6% interest, the
municipality would receive a total of over $1,806. The revenue from
the city's investment, therefore, would exceed its total obligation on the
refunding bond by $246, or almost twenty-five percent of the principal
amount of the bond. If such compounding occurs over a twenty-year
period, the differential amounts to slightly over $826 or more than fourfifths of the principal.
The fortuitous discovery of this arbitrage possibility quite predictably led to a great deal of financing, not all of which involved the
refunding of outstanding obligations. In perhaps the most ambitious
case, an issuer proposed the issuance of $100,000,000 of tax-exempt
bonds. Approximately $90,000,000 of the proceeds were to be applied
to the purchase of United States Government bonds which, bearing a
higher rate of interest, would provide funds adequate to retire the taxexempt bonds and to leave available the remaining $10,000,000 for
financial aid to the public schools. It was transactions such as this one
which finally aroused the concern of the Treasury Department and which
resulted in its repeated attempts to regulate the misuse of the tax
exemption for municipal securities.9 Prior to discussing these regulations, it will be helpful to note briefly the principal techniques of
advance refunding.
9. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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Advance Refunding Techniques
(1)

Standard Defeasance. Standard defeasance is the advance

refunding scheme most frequently used. With this technique, new bonds
are issued in such an amount that a lump-sum investment of the proceeds will return principal and interest sufficient to pay the principal,
interest, and redemption premiums, if any, on the bonds being refunded.

The proceeds and income from the refunding bonds are used to pay the
refunded obligation; the refunding bonds are themselves secured by the
source of revenue which originally secured the refunded bonds.' 0
10. The chart below will illustrate the situation if we assume the following set of
circumstances: an issuer has outstanding $10,845,000 Bonds, bearing interest at five
percent per annum and is refunding them with $10,000,000 Refunding Bonds which will
bear interest at six percent per annum payable semiannually; the proceeds of the
Refunding Bonds will be invested in United States Government obligations which also
bear interest at six percent per annum; all three sets of obligations mature and bear
interest payable on the same dates. Thus, the principal and interest on the refunding
bonds will be in the same amounts and payable on the same dates as the respective
principal and interest on the government obligations as shown below.
ESCROW INVESTMENT
CUMULATIVE
INCOME; REFUNDING
SIX MONTHS
OLD BONDS
BONDS PAYMENTS
BALANCE**
$10,845,000 at 5%
$10,000,000 at 6%
YEAR
Principal
Principal
and Interest*
Principal
and Interest*
Principal
$28,875
$271,125
$300,000
2,750
596,125
$325,000
570,000
$270,000
1
31,650
263,000
291,900
5,550
608,000
345,000
581,900
290,000
2
34,375
254,375
283,200
3,200
619,375
365,000
588,200
305,000
3
32,000
245,250
274,050
5,800
625,250
380,000
599,050
325,000
4
34,350
235,750
264,300
7,900
635,750
400,000
609,300
345,000
5
36,100
225,750
253,950
4,300
650,750
425,000
618,950
365,000
6
32,175
215,125
243,000
5,050
655,125
440,000
628,000
385,000
7
32,375
204,125
231,450
9,700
669,125
465,000
646,450
415,000
8
36,200
192,500
219,000
7,700
682,500
490,000
654,000
435,000
9
33,400
180,250
205,950
9,100
690,250
510,000
665,950
460,000
10
33,750
167,500
192,150
8,400
702,500
535,000
677,150
485,000
11
31,875
154,125
177,600
10,350
714,125
560,000
692,600
515,000
12
32,375
140,125
162,150
14,400
725,125
585,000
707,150
545,000
13
34,700
125,500
145,800
15,000
745,500
620,000
725,800
580,000
14
33,400
110,000
128,400
16,800
760,000
650,000
743,400
615,000
15
33,000
93,750
109,950
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(2) Full cash defeasance. In a full cash defeasance, refunding
bonds are issued in such an amount that the proceeds alone are sufficient to pay principal, interest, and redemption premiums on all of the
refunded bonds. The revenue previously used to support the refunded
bonds is now freed to secure the refunding bonds. This scheme thus
differs from the standard defeasance in that there is no reliance on
accruing interest from investments to pay the principle of or interest on
the refunded bonds. Nevertheless, the money received from the new
issue is invested, usually in United States Government bonds, and produces a substantial yield. This yield is often pledged to the payment of
a secondary issue of refunding bonds known as special obligation bonds.
Thus, in a typical full cash defeasance there will be three related bond
issues: the refunded bonds, supported by the proceeds of the refunding
bonds; the refunding bonds, supported by the same source of revenue
as had previously supported the refunded bonds; and the special obligation bonds, supported by the yield on the investment of proceeds
of the refunding issue.
Since the special obligation bonds are secured by the yield on
United States Government bonds, they are generally rated highly by the
rating agencies and will invariably bear a lower interest rate than the
issue secured by the original source of revenue. The arbitrage advantages of a full cash defeasance have been severely circumscribed by
Treasury regulations," and the use of the technique is therefore largely
limited to situations in which a mortgage or other indenture securing the
old bonds must be released and the trustee refuses to release it until he
has received the full amount of principal and interest in cash.
(3) Crossover Refunding. Crossover refunding is a variation on
the two defeasance schemes, distinguishable by the way in which the two
issues of bonds are secured. Maturing principal of and interest on the
16

650,000

759,950
680,000
773,750
19,200
90,450
76,750
32,900
17
690,000
780,450
715,000
791,750
21,600
69,750
58,875
32,475
18
730,000
799,750
745,000
803,875
28,350
47,850
40,250
35,950
19
775,000
822,850
790,000
830,250
28,550
24,600
20,500
32,650
20
820,000
844,600
820,000
840,500
36,750
* For each year, two figures are presented. The first represents a semiannual payment of interest only. The second figure is the total annual payment of principal plus
the semiannual interest payment.
** This figure represents the cumulative excess of principal and interest payable on
the refunding bonds (and also being generated by the United States Government bonds
purchased with the proceeds of the refunding bonds) over the payments due on the
old bonds.
11. See notes 35-36 infra and accompanying text.
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refunded bonds continues to be paid from the same source of income
which originally secured them. The interest on the refunding bonds is
paid with the interest earned by the escrow investment, which typically
involves federal government bonds. No refunding bonds mature until
after redemption of the refunded bonds; thereupon the refunding bonds
are secured by the same source as the refunded bonds. Although the
security to be provided by the government bonds might be viewed as

enhancing the marketability of the refunding issue, the use of crossover
refunding seems to depend primarily on the preferences of local bond
2
counsel and the purpose to be achieved by the refunding.

State Regulation of Advance Refunding
No state has forbidden its political subdivisions to engage in ad-

vance refunding of its obligations, and in several states the practice has
been expressly approved either by statute 3 or by court decisions.'

4

The

flexibility allowed is limited in many states, however. For example, the
maximum period for which the proceeds of a refunding issue can remain
in escrow may be restricted by law.', Or, if the refunding securities
are general obligation bonds, they may be counted against the issuer's
debt limit, thus foreclosing other financing options."0 This problem has

been overcome in some states by judicial decisions permitting the municipality to use a sinking fund established for the payment of the outstand-

ing bonds as an offset against the amount of such bonds in computing
compliance with the debt limit.' 7

In other, states, however, this is not

possible.' 8
12. For example, the author has learned that the full cash defeasance method is
commonly used in Ohio and Indiana.
13. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-535.01C (Supp. 1975):
[T]he net proceeds [of refunding bonds] may be invested in obligations issued
by the United States government, or one of its agencies, or obligations fully
guaranteed by the United States government . . . so long as such investments
will mature with interest so as to provide funds to pay when due, or called for
redemption, the bonds . . . to be refunded together with interest thereon and
redemption premiums, if any ....
14. See, e.g., Taxpayers and Citizens v. Shelby County, 246 Ala. 192, 20 So. 2d 36
(1944); State v. City of Orlando, 82 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1955).
15. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-6-34.1(G) (Supp. 1975) (only those bonds
which mature or are callable within 20 years of issuance of refunding bonds can be
refunded absent voluntary surrender by the holders); OKLA. STAT. tit. 69, § 1719(b)
(1971) (10 years).
16. See, e.g., State v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 177 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1965).
17. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Teed, 112 Cal. 319, 44 P. 580 (1896); Lloyd
Corp. v. Bannock County, 53 Idaho 478, 25 P.2d 217 (1933).
18. See, e.g., Doon Township v. Cummins, 142 U.S. 366 (1892); Miles v. State,
96 Ga. App. 610, 101 S.E.2d 173 (1957); Murphy v. Spokane, 64 Wash. 681, 117 P.
476 (1911).
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A third potential state law restriction on the practice of advance
refunding is a statutory or constitutional requirement for voter approval
of bonds. 19 Some state courts, however, have held that refunding bonds
do not require an election unless the source of payment is altered or the
principal amount of the bond issue is enlarged by virtue of the refund20
ing.
Finally, there may be some question about permitting the refunded
bonds to remain outstanding beyond the first date upon which they are
callable for redemption under their terms. In Florida, for example, the
first available redemption date must be used, at least as to general
obligation bonds. 2 1 As a practical matter, whenever it is necessary to
refund low interest rate bonds with bonds bearing a higher rate, 22 it is to
the financial advantage of the issuer to let the old bonds run to maturity.
The reason for this is that the investments made with the proceeds of
refunding bonds will return interest at a rate higher than that payable on
the refunded bonds and, therefore, a smaller principal dmount of investments can be used to achieve the payment of the old bonds. Note in
this connection that even if the refunding bonds bear a higher interest
rate than the refunded bonds, the dollar amount of principle and interest
payable should be about equal because of the lower principal amount of
the refunding issue.23 In addition, by waiting until maturity to redeem
the refunded bonds, the municipality can avoid the payment of redemption premiums. When high interest rate bonds are being refunded into
lower interest rate bonds, in the absence of arbitrage opportunities, it
would be appropriate to call the old bonds on the first available redemption date as a general rule.2 4
19. See, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. XIV, § 3. But see FLA. CONsT. art. 7, § 12
(specifically exempting refunding bonds from election requirement).
20. See, e.g., Adams v. Pritchard, 88 Idaho 325, 399 P.2d 252 (1965). See also
State v. Citrus County, 116 Fla. 676, 692, 157 So. 4, 10-11 (1934).
21. State v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 177 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1965).
22. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
23. See note 10 supra.
24. Prior to the issuance of the most recently proposed Treasury regulations in this
area, see notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text, the arbitrage opportunities available
through advance refunding worked against this rule, often making it more profitable for
the issuer to leave the old bonds outstanding until maturity. Note that in the example
shown in note 10 supra, the principal payable each year on the $10,000,000 isssue
is somewhat less than the principal payable on the $10,845,000 issue in the same year;
this is due to the fact that a portion of the principal of the larger issue falling due in
each year is paid from the excess of the interest on the investments accruing in that year
over the interest payable on the refunding issue. If the old issue is called for redemption
prior to maturity, the period within which this interest differential will operate to pay
part of the principal of the old issue will diminish and, therefore, a larger principal
amount of refunding bonds will be required.
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FEDERAL REGULATION OF ADVANCE REFUNDING-

TAx LAW

Because the arbitrage potential of an advance refunding is a product of the exploitation of the federal tax exemption given to interest on
municipal bonds, most of the regulation of the practice has been
accomplished through the tax laws. The first public indication that the
Treasury Department was aware of the arbitrage problem was given on
August 11, 1966 in the form of a Technical Information Release issued
by the Internal Revenue Service. The release announced that, pending a
study of the problem, the Service would not grant any rulings in
situations:
1. Where all or a substantial part of the proceeds of [an] issue
(other than normal contingency reserves such as debt service reserves)
are only to be invested in taxable obligations which are, in turn, to
be held as security for the retirement of the obligations of the government unit.
2. Where the proceeds of [an] issue are to be used to refund
outstanding obligations which are first callable more than five years
in the future, and in the interim, are -to be invested in taxable obligations held as security for the satisfaction of either the current issue or
the issue to be refunded. "5
This release resulted in a moratorium on most advance refundings
which remained in effect until the passage of the Tax Reform Act of
1969, which dealt expressly with the problem.2" A new provision,
section 103(d), was added to the Internal Revenue Code, denying the
municipal securities tax exemption2 7 to the interest on "arbitrage bonds."
These bonds were defined as
any obligation which is issued as part of an issue all or a major portion
of the proceeds of which are reasonably expected to be used directly
or indirectly(A) to acquire . . . obligations . . . which may be reasonably
expected at the time of issuance . . . to produce a yield over the term

of the issue which is materially higher (taking into account any discount or premium) than the yield on obligations of such issue, or
(B) to replace funds which were used directly or indirectly to
acquire securities or obligations described in subparagraph (A) .28
25. TIR-840, U.S. TAx
26.
1954, §
27.
28.

WK.-1966 ANNUAL DIGEST, at 787.
See Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 601(a), 83 Stat. 656 (codified at INT. REV. CODE OF
103(c)).
See note 3'supra and accompanying text.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103(d) (2).
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Certain exceptions were made which are not pertinent here, and a
special rule declared that an obligation
shall not be treated as an arbitrage bond solely by reason of the fact
that(B) an amount of the proceeds of the issue of which such obligation is a part may be invested in securities or other obligations which
29
are part of a reasonably required reserve or replacement fund.
The Treasury Department then promulgated a series of temporary
and proposed regulations designed to remove arbitrage as an inducement
to advance refunding while preserving advance refunding as a legitimate
tool of municipal finance. Many of these efforts focused on the definition of two key phrases in the statute: the "major portion of the proceeds" and a "materially higher" yield.
Originally, the Treasury defined the "major portion" as more than
five percent of the available proceeds.30 The proposed regulations were
later amended to raise the "major portion" standard to "an amount in
excess of fifteen percent of the original face amount of the issue."'" This
provision complements the limitation on the "reasonably required reserve or replacement fund" to an amount not in excess of fifteen
percent of the face amount of the issue."2 The significance of these
provisions, of course, is that there is no restriction on the use of this
reserve, often referred to as the "minor portion" of the proceeds, and
therefore these funds can be invested in obligations which produce a
high yield. As will be discussed below, this possibility was largely
responsible for the continued misuse of advance refunding schemes. 33
The definition of a "materially higher yield" has also varied. At
first, the Treasury proposed that a return more than one eighth of one
percent higher than that being paid on the refunding bonds be prohibit29. Id. § 103(c)(4).

30. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(a)(3)(ii), 37 Fed. Reg. 10,946 (1972). No
final regulations governing arbitrage bonds have ever been put into effect. However,
prudent bond counsel treat the proposed regulations as law, since such regulations
generally contain a provision which would make them retroactive to the date of first
publication if finalized.
31. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(1)(ii), 40 Fed. Reg. 56,448 (1975). Prior
to the 1975 amendments, the Treasury had taken an intermediate position, defining the
"major portion" as the lesser of 15% of the original face amount of the issue or 5% plus
one and a third times one year's debt service.

Proposed Treas. Reg.

§ 1.103-

13 (a) (3)(ii), 38 Fed. Reg. 10,944 (1973).
32. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-14(f)(1), 37 Fed. Reg. 10,954 (1973).

provision has remained the same throughout the series of amendments.
33. See notes 36-37 infra and accompanying text.

This
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ed.; 4 It was later determined that any difference between the interest
paid on the refunding bonds and the yield on the securities in which the
proceeds were invested would be viewed as "material."33 These provisions were probably more counterproductive than effective because, in
restricting the yield which a political subdivision could receive, the
Treasury in effect prohibited these issuers from applying bond proceeds
to the purchase of investments at the market price, which is determined
by yield. Thus, the only way a political subdivision could invest bond
proceeds in an advance refunding transaction was to pay an artificially
high price for the investments made with a major portion of the bond
proceeds in order to produce the low yield required by the regulations.
Naturally, the opportunity to sell investments to issuers of municipal
bonds at a price substantially above the market was not overlooked by
many underwriters. By convincing municipal officials that advance
refundings were to their benefit notwithstanding the restriction on the
use of the major portion of the proceeds of the issue, the underwriter
stood to make a windfall profit consisting of the difference between the
market price of the securities purchased with the major portion and the
price which the issuer was required to pay.36
In spite of these disadvantages, many municipalities were receptive
to the underwriters' suggestion of an advance refunding for two reasons.
First, interest rates in general were lower in 1975 and 1976 than in the
early 1970s. By refunding bonds issued during the earlier period,
therefore, the issuer could save a substantial amount of interest. 37 Second, while the arbitrage profits on the major portion (prohibited by the
new regulations) were substantial, the remaining arbitrage opportunities
for the unrestricted minor portion of the proceeds were still significant.
The issuer reasoned that even if an underwriter should make $500,000
from such a transaction and the issuer should save only $200,000, it was
nevertheless $200,000 which would not otherwise have been saved.
34. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(5), 37 Fed. Reg. 10,946 (1972). A differential of 1/ of one percent was permitted for bonds issued before July 1, 1972. Id.
35. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b) (5), 40 Fed. Reg. 56,448 (1975).
36. Some underwriters euphemistically referred to this bonanza as the "federally
mandated profit."
37. Absent the potential for arbitrage profits, an advance refunding solely for the
purpose of saving interest is a speculative venture. The issuer is in effect gambling that
interest rates are lower on the date of the advance refunding than they will be on the
first redemption date of the outstanding bonds, at which time the bonds could be refunded in a conventional manner. Since the proceeds of the advance refunding bonds
can be invested at a yield not exceeding that being paid on the new bonds, there is no
interest savings attributable to the period between the advance refunding and the actual
redemption of the outstanding bonds.
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The Internal Revenue Service adopted and unofficially publicized a
policy to the effect that if the only advantage of a new issue to an issuer
was attributable to the minor portion investments, the issue would not
be regarded as issued for a governmental purpose of the issuer.38
Therefore, the entire issue would amount to a violation of the regulations which prescribed that a tax-exempt bond issue may not exceed, by
more than five percent, the amount necessary for "the governmental
purpose" of the issuer. 39 Needless to say, it became quite fashionable to
find some governmental purpose for an advance refunding to use as a
hook upon which to support a transaction that would never have been
undertaken by the issuer except for the savings attributable to arbitrage
profits and would never have been proposed by the underwriter except
for the profits he could get by selling investments at a higher-than40
market price.
The underwriters' windfall, however, eventually came to an end.
Two forces were responsible for this occurrence. In the first place,
resentment grew within the financial community (generated primarily
by those underwriters who were not engaging successfully in advance
refundings) against the use of advance refundings, particularly in situations where the transaction did little real good for the issuer other than
generating arbitrage profits. Additionally, many of the successful underwriters felt that they were simply not entitled to such a large profit
and expressed willingness to take a considerably smaller return by giving
away some of the windfall profit.4 ' The profit with which these underwriters were willing to part could not be rebated to the issuer, for such a
gift would amount to increasing the yield on the investments made with
the issuer's bond proceeds. Two potential objects of beneficence were
left: charity and the federal government. Not surprisingly, many local
governments chose to have the excess profit, or a substantial part
thereof, go to local charities rather than to Washington. However, it
was unclear whether such a gift to a local charity would be regarded as a
38. This policy was not published in any official report, but it became known to
various bond counsel through discussions with members of the staff of the Internal
Revenue Service and through speeches by members of the staff of the Internal Revenue
Service to institutes at which bond lawyers were present. The wisdom of promulgating
policy in this fashion is outside the scope of this paper.
39. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13 (b) (5) (iv), 40 Fed. Reg. 56,448 (1975).
40. Such governmental purposes included the combining of principal and interest
payments on a number of different bond issues into payments on a single larger bond
issue, shortening or lengthening the maturities of the issuer's indebtedness and modifying
covenants securing bonds (even though the issuer was perfectly happy with the existing
covenants at the time of the refunding but might later want to take advantage of some
relaxation of those covenants).

41. See THE WEEKLY

BOND

BuYvaR, Aug. 30, 1976, at 1.
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gift to the political subdivision (and42therefore a prohibited increase in
the yield on the issuer's investments).
The municipal issuer then was faced with the problem of having to
find prudent investments for the refunding bond proceeds which returned interest no higher than that payable on the bonds themselves.

If

the proceeds were to be invested in safe, high-yield federal securities, the
excess profit margin had to be appropriated by someone other than the

issuer-typically the underwriter, in the form of tainted windfall profits.
As soon as this dilemma became apparent, the Treasury Department

provided a way out by offering a special series of government bonds
("book entry" bonds) available only to state and local governments.
The interest on these bonds is less than that paid on other federal

securities, and is commensurate, rather, with the prevailing municipal
bond rate. 43 These bonds have the additional attraction of solving the
problem, common to all fixed-maturity securities, of the bonds maturing
before the bondholder can use the funds. This is accomplished by
permitting the purchaser to set the maturity date. Municipalities en-

gaged in a refunding are thereby enabled to avoid having to leave any
money uninvested during the period between the maturity of the invest-

ment and the maturity of the bonds being refunded. 44

The most recent amendments to the proposed arbitrage regula-

tions, issued on October 29, 1976,15 go even further toward insuring
42. If the windfall profit were to be given to a charity which performs a function
that the issuer of the bonds would otherwise perform, such a gift might result in reducing
the burden to the issuer and thus constitute a prohibited return to the issuer on the
issuer's investment. For example, a gift to a county hospital might reduce the amount
that the governing body of the county would have to appropriate to run the hospital.
43. Book entry bonds can be bought at any rate of interest not higher than oneeighth of one percent below the going rate of interest for other government bonds of the
same maturity. 31 C.F.R. § 344.1(b) (2) (1976).
44. At the same time the Treasury announced the new book entry bonds, it also
proposed to the Congress the enactment of a law which would provide that a political
subdivision could obtain a one-eighth of one percent arbitrage advantage on the entire
escrow investment if it used book entry bonds exclusively. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHANGE 148 (1973).
This was calculated to eliminate the windfall
profit to underwriters by making it more profitable to municipalities to give the windfall
to the federal government. The proposal was made shortly before the controversy
involving the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee affected the work of
that committee, and no action was taken by the Congress.
45. The proposed regulations provide that as to the material announced by a press
release on September 24, 1976, such regulations would be effective from and after that
date; as to certain other matters not mentioned in the press release, the regulations would
be effective October 29, 1976, with a grace period until November 29 (or 30 days later
in some circumstances) with respect to bonds sold before October 29. Proposed Treas.
Reg, § 1.103-13(a)(3), 41 Fed. Reg. 47,682 (1976).
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that almost all advance refunding will be accomplished through the use
of book entry bonds. These rules provide that in calculating the yield
on the obligations acquired with the major portion of the proceeds of a
refunding issue for the purpose of determining whether such yield is
"materially higher" than that of the refunding issue, the "market price"
of the obligations, as determined by reference to an established market,
shall be used.4" Where there is no established market for such obliga4
tions, the refunding bonds shall be presumed to be arbitrage bonds.
The effect of this provision is to eliminate the potential windfall to
underwriters since the yield on escrow investments can no longer be
artificially lowered.
In addition, the new amendments prohibit investment of the minor
portion of the refunding bond proceeds in higher yielding obligations.4 8
Thus, the Treasury has removed much of the incentive for underwriters
to promote advance refundings and much of the incentive for issuers to
advance refund outstanding bonds, except for legitimate governmental
purposes sufficient in themselves to justify a refunding.
Nevertheless, a close examination of the new amendments reveals a
potential means for a bond dealer, acting as fiscal advisor, to extract an
added financial benefit from an advance refunding. In computing the
yield on both the refunding bonds and the bonds purchased with the
proceeds of the refunding bonds, "the present value of the administrative
costs of issuing, carrying and repaying the issue and the present value of
the administrative costs to be incurred in purchasing, carrying and
selling or redeeming acquired obligations shall be taken into account as
That is, if the issuer incurs admina premium or discount . . . .
istrative costs in issuing the refunding bonds it may -treat the present
value of those administrative costs as a discount on the principal amount
of the bonds; if it incurs administrative costs in acquiring the escrow
investments (the "acquired obligations") it may treat the present value
of such administrative costs as a premium on the purchase price of the
escrow investments in computing the yield. One of such expenses is a
fiscal advisor's fee.
The choice of whether to allocate the costs of an advance refunding
to the refunding bond issue or the escrow investment becomes significant
if the refunding bond issue and the escrow investment run for substantially different periods of time. For example, assume that a municipality
"4

46.
47.
48.
49.

Proposed
Proposed
Proposed
Proposed

Treas.
Treas.
Treas.
Treas.

Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.

§
§
§
§

1.103-13(c)(1)(iii)(A),
1.103-13()(1)(iii)(B),
1.103-14(e)(5)(ii)(B),
1.103-13(c)(1)(ii), 41

41 Fed. Reg. 47,684 (1976).
41 Fed. Reg. 47,684 (1976).
41 Fed.'Reg. 47,685 (1976).
Fed. Reg. 47,683 (1976).
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issues $1,000,000 of six percent refunding bonds which will mature in
twenty years. The proceeds of this issue are to be deposited in escrow
and invested in government bonds payable in ten years. The
rate of return on these government bonds will be limited by the
arbitrage regulations to the interest rate payable on the refunding
bonds 5°-six percent in this case. Assume further that the administrative costs of this plan are $10,000, or one percent of the refunding issue.
If these costs are treated as a discount on the sale of the refunding bonds,
the interest rate payable, which determines the maximum permissible
yield on the escrow investment, will be calculated on the basis of
$990,000. In other words, although -the total interest payable is a fixed
constant, it will be treated as interest on an issue of $990,000 rather
than $1,000,000 in determining the yield used in fixing the investment
ceiling-in this case 6.0871%. The issuer can recoup only part of these
costs, however, by purchasing escrow investments with a yield equal to
this higher yield on the refunding bonds. The increased yield on the ten
year escrow investment would have a present value of only $6,480, so
that less than two-thirds of the costs allocated to the refunding issue
would be recovered.
If, on the other hand, the administrative costs are treated as a
premium on the cost of the escrow investment, the maximum permissible yield on the investment will be figured on the basis of six percent of
$1,100,000. Since only $1,000,000 will actually be invested, the
municipality will be able to obtain a return of 6.14% without exceeding
its overall limit. The present value of this increased yield on the
escrow investments should be sufficient to enable the issuer to recover
all of its administrative costs over the course of ten years.51 The allocation of these costs, therefore, can have a significant impact on the
financial advantage to be gained from undertaking an advanced refunding. Perhaps more importantly, this example illustrates that in spite of
the restrictive new regulations, there is still room in which an imagina52
tive fiscal advisor can operate.
50. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b) (5), 40 Fed. Reg. 56,448 (1975). See text
accompanying note 35 supra.
51. If, as is sometimes the case, the escrow runs for a longer period than the
refunding issue, the full administrative costs can be recovered by taking the converse
course and treating them as a discount on the proceeds of the refunding bonds, thereby
increasing the permissible yield on the escrow investments.
52. Perhaps for this reason, the Treasury has placed a special limitation on the
amount of fiscal agent fees which can be included in the administrative costs of an
advance refunding. Such fees cannot exceed three percent of the principal face amount
of the refunding issue below $1,000,000 plus one percent of the face amount of the
refunding issue in excess of $1,000,000. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(c)(1)(ii), 41
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Finally, it should be noted that the proposed regulations affect
certain practices which are normally adopted without regard to the possibility of arbitrage. For example, municipal issuers often create a reserve out of a portion of the proceeds of a bond issue which is capitalized and held for payment of the bonds when due. If these bonds are
refunded, this capitalized reserve may be treated as "transferred proceeds" of the refunding bond issue and, therefore, subject to the same
yield restrictions as the actual proceeds of the new issue when the
53
refunded bonds are discharged.
Another common advance refunding practice is to retain uninvested funds in the escrow account for short periods of time. For example,
in an ordinary advance refunding -there is, at the end of each date upon
which principal or interest of the old bonds is to be paid, a balance left
in the escrow account due to the fact that the maturing escrow investments and interest thereon will never exactly meet the amounts of principal and interest falling due on the bonds being refunded.ri4 This
remaining balance is typically retained in the escrow account until the
next interest payment date, when it will be combined with other money
derived from maturing principal and interest on the investments to make
the next payment of principal and interest on the refunded bonds. The
bank holding these running balances is normally instructed not to invest
them so that there will be no danger of the yield on escrow investments
exceeding the amount permitted by the arbitrage regulations. However,
under the new amendments, this direction not to invest the money may
amount to a transfer of arbitrage profits to the bank. The issuer can
avoid this problem by directing the bank to invest such balances, to the
extent possible, in non-interest-bearing obligations of the United States.
Perhaps as demand for such obligations becomes known, they will
become available in book entry form, as their issuance would obviously
be beneficial to the federal government.
An additional problem occurs when an issuer finds it necessary to
refund low interest rate bonds into higher interest rate bonds and,
Fed. Reg. 47,683 (1976). Within this limitation, however, there is little incentive to
minimize fiscal agent fees. As described above, where the period of the escrow is equal
to or longer than the duration of the refunding bonds, the issuer will be able to recover
all of its administrative costs through the increased yield obtainable by wisely allocating
those costs. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text. The Treasury may be able
to impose further restrictions on the amount of the fiscal agent's fee under section 1.10313(c)(1)(ii) which prohibits the issuer from taking into account as legitimate fees
"amounts designed to divert arbitrage to the recipient." However, the problems of proof
under that provision seem considerable.
53. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-14(e) (2) (ii), 40 Fed. Reg. 56,450 (1975).
54. See the table in note 10 supra, particularly the column headed "Cumulative Six
Months Balance."
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therefore, must use the interest on the escrow investments to pay part of
the principal of the bonds being refunded. Interest on the book entry
government bonds in which the escrow funds are typically invested is
payable semiannually while the principal of the bonds being refunded is,
in most cases, payable annually. That portion of interest on the escrow
investments which falls due onl an interest payment date other than a
principal payment date and which is to be used to pay part of the
principal of the bonds being refunded, therefore, must lie idle for six
months. This idle money is likely to be subject to the same restrictions
against either investment or holding in a bank deposit as the cash
balances mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The fact that this
money cannot be reinvested means that the issuer will have to issue a
larger amount of refunding bonds than it otherwise would because it
cannot get the advantage of the earnings on such idle money. This
particular problem could be solved to the advantage of both the federal
government and the issuer of the refunding bonds by the creation of
book entry bonds paying interest annually or semiannually at the option
of the purchaser.
In summary, the new amendments to the proposed regulations
should bring at least a temporary halt to the use of advance refundings
as a means of obtaining arbitrage profits. In addition, the regulations
will affect some practices employed in advance refundings undertaken
for legitimate governmental purposes.
FEDERAL REGULATION UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS

Since advance refunding schemes have not been entirely forbidden,
and since many advance refunding bonds remain outstanding, a discussion of the potential applicability of the federal securities laws to transactions involving these bonds is appropriate.
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933," 5 which prohibits
fraud in the sale of securities, and section 10(b) of the Securities
55. Section 17(a) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. Securities
Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
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Exchange Act of 1934,56 which applies to both the purchase and sale of

securities, seem to impose a duty on an underwriter promoting an
advance refunding to disclose to the municipality all material facts
concerning the transaction. 57 Regardless of whether the proceeds of the
refunding bonds are invested in regular Treasury bonds or in book
entry bonds, the facts which must be disclosed are similar.
One of the material facts certainly is that the investments are being
sold to the issuer at a price substantially higher than the market price for
like investments of equivalent yield. 58 The issuer should also be apprised of the foreclosure of future financing opportunities. For example, if interest rates continue to fall after an advance refunding, the
municipality will not ordinarily be able to obtain the approval of bond

counsel to undertake a second advance refunding of the same underlying
indebtedness until the escrow investment is terminated. 59

Thus, the

issuer could not take advantage of the reduction in interest rates until the
first call date of the new refunding bonds, when it could simply refund
those obligations.

Likewise, when a revenue bond issue is advance

refunded, the opportunity for a further advance refunding in order to
modify a burdensome covenant is gone until the first call date for the
refunding bonds or the termination of the escrow.

One factor which is not quite so apparent should also be considered. Typically, the issuer must rely entirely on the calculations of the
56. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for any person
[to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
.... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules . . . as [the SEC] may prescribe . . . . Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
Pursuant to this section, the SEC promulgated Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), which proscribes with regard to the purchase or sale of any
security the same practices prohibited by section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. See
note 55 supra.
57. In some situations, the entrepreneur promoting the scheme will neither buy the
refunding bonds nor sell the government bonds to the issuer but will merely take a fee as
a fiscal advisor to the issuer. Although the 1933 and 1934 Acts do not apply to a
financial advisor (except in the case of a conspiracy between the financial advisor and
such buyer or seller), the financial advisor could be found to have a fiduciary relationship with the issuer. See City of Miami v. Benson, 63 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1953).
58. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
59. Whenever an advance refunding occurs, there are two bond issues outstanding
representing the same borrowing by the issuer. Adding a third such issue by a "double
advance refunding" has been neither upheld nor struck down by any court of last resort
(although such a case is now being appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida),
nor do statutes shed any light on the subject. Since there seems to be no reason why the
pyramiding of advance refundings must stop with a double advance refunding, it is
conceivable that the number of bond issues representing the same underlying borrowing
could be expanded indefinitely if not stopped after the first one.
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underwriter or fiscal advisor to determine whether and how much will
be saved as a result of the advance refunding. The underwriter or fiscal
advisor will often be able to manipulate the maturity schedule of the
refunding bonds to allow such savings to be realized either immediately,
at regular intervals, or upon the maturity of the refunding bonds. The
issuer should be informed, therefore, of both the ultimate savings and
the present value of such amount prior to undertaking the refunding.
This problem is alleviated under the new regulations which require the
issuer to include in its certification of a refunding issue "° issued for the
purpose of saving interest a statement of the interest to be saved by the
refunding and the present value of that interest. "'
One other practice could also lead to liability under the anti-fraud
provisions if all of the facts are not fully disclosed to the purchasers of
the refunding bonds. Prior to the creation of book entry bonds, it was
sometimes found expedient to invest the proceeds of refunding bonds in
certificates of deposit of a bank. 2 The bank's debt as represented by
these certificates is normally secured by U.S. government bonds which it
holds. Therefore, such certificates are generally thought to be quite
safe. There is, however, a significant danger associated with these
instruments. Typically, the collateral is lodged with a bank other than
that issuing the certificate. If the issuing bank should fail, the bank
holding the collateral may not be able to release it until given permission
by a bankruptcy court, which may take a considerable amount of time if
other creditors of the defunct bank dispute the right of the certificate
holder to the collateral. In the meantime, the advance refunding escrow
would not be receiving the funds necessary to retire the refunded bonds.
The holders of these old bonds, who are seldom asked to consent to an
advance refunding, will still be entitled to realize on the security shown
on the face of their bonds (e.g., utility revenues or a special tax levy).
As discussed earlier, however, this source of revenue is normally used to
secure the refunding bonds since income from the escrow investments is
counted on to repay the refunded bonds. 3 The holders of the refund60. The proposed arbitrage regulations permit the issuer of refunding bonds to
certify in the bond indenture that the proceeds of the issue "will [not] be used in a
manner that would cause such obligations to be arbitrage bonds." Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 1.103-13(a)(2)(ii), 38 Fed. Reg. 10,945 (1973). The holders of these bonds can rely
upon this certification with regard to whether the interest on the bonds is exempt from
federal income tax. Id.
61. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(a)(2) (ii), 41 Fed. Reg. 47,682 (1975).
62. Typically, certificates of deposit are quite flexible as to the denomination and
date of maturity, so they match up nicely to the requirements of the escrow account in
paying out the principal of and interest on the refunded bonds.
63. See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text.
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ing bonds, therefore, are left in a precarious position. If, for example,
the bonds were issued to advance refund utility revenue bonds, the
holders would have only a junior lien on the utility revenues. Their
bonds would be virtually unsecured unless the issuer could be persuaded
to increase utility rates in an amount sufficient to provide funds to repay
both the refunding and refunded issue. Whether the bondholders could
compel such action is uncertain.64 In any event, it is clear that the
holders of the refunding bonds will have suffered considerable injury and
may be able to recover damages under the anti-fraud provisions if the
material facts about the transaction were not made known to them at the
time of their purchase.
CONCLUSION

The possibility of deriving arbitrage profits through an advance
refunding of municipal obligations began as simply an attractive side
effect of engaging in such a transaction but quickly became the major
impetus for a great deal of municipal financing. By issuing tax-exempt
bonds at a low interest rate and investing the proceeds in higher-yielding
obligations, municipalities were able to obtain financial benefits far in
excess of the interest savings normally achieved by a refunding. The
Treasury Department's efforts to control this abuse of the special tax
status given municipal obligations were initially unsuccessful, primarily
because of the failure to remove the incentives to underwriters and other
fiscal advisors to promote advance refundings. The most recent regulations, however, severely limit the gains to be made by either the underwriters or the municipal issuers and should bring to a halt advance

refundings undertaken for other than legitimate purposes. Nevertheless, a close examination of these regulations reveals that the possibility
of some "extra" profits for the fiscal advisor remains.
Finally, whatever the effect of the recently proposed regulations,

large amounts of previously issued refunding obligations are presently
outstanding.

Should the distribution of these securities be challenged

under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws and be
subjected to the intense judicial scrutiny typically associated with such
actions, the failure to make full disclosure of certain facts concerning
these issues could result in liability for both the issuers and underwriters.
64. See generally Note, Creditors' Remedies in Municipal Default, 1976 DuKF L.J.
1363.

